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Justice Chicago Style
Owen M. Fisst
In the late 1970s and early 1980s a new movement took root in
the bar. It was called Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") and
was for the most part an attack upon the strong exercises of judi-
cial power that marked the previous decade. The proponents of
ADR sought to substitute a number of alternative processes for ad-
judication. Most of these processes have been around for a long,
long time. What the proponents of ADR did, however, was to place
a new emphasis upon these alternative processes and organize
them into a program. Some of these processes, like arbitration, in-
volve a third-party decision maker and thus seem similar to adju-
dication, but are in truth private. Others, like mediation and set-
tlement, are more explicitly private. They contemplate the
resolution of disputes through bargaining and negotiation.
As a movement, ADR had its origin in a series of speeches by
Chief Justice Burger in the mid 1970s. The movement was nour-
ished by the same forces that gave rise to the politics of "deregula-
tion" and "privatization" that dominated the late 1970s and early
1980s, and that reached something of a zenith during the early
years of the Reagan presidency. In the summer of 1983, however,
the political base of ADR was significantly broadened by two
events-the search for alternatives was endorsed by the President
of Harvard, Derek Bok, a liberal spokesman of some prominence,
and the American Association of Law Schools decided to form a
new section exclusively devoted to ADR. At the annual convention
of the Association, held in San Francisco in January 1984, a joint
meeting of the Civil Procedure and ADR sections was held to cele-
brate the founding of the ADR section. The speech that later be-
came Against Settlement' was my own peculiar celebratory
offering.
t Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Public Law, Yale University. George Priest and
Madeline Morris helped me with this essay. I also benefited from the work of Jules Coleman
and Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 103 (1986), and the discus-
sion of their paper at a faculty workshop at Yale.
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984).
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In that talk, I focused on the relationship between the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and ADR. By way of introduction, I
pointed to the 1983 amendment to Rule 16, which enhanced the
role of judges in brokering settlements. That amendment, I argued,
created a danger, stressed by Professor Judith Resnik in her earlier
work2 and given dramatic statement in the Agent Orange case, 3 of
the judge becoming thoroughly enmeshed in the settlement negoti-
ations. Such involvement would, in my judgment, constitute an
abuse of the judicial office and dash all hopes of an impartial deci-
sion if the negotiations failed and the case had to go trial. But this
is not a reason to be against settlement, but only to be opposed to
a certain kind of settlement, one in which the bargaining relation-
ship is transformed from a two to a three party format, and in
which the judge becomes the third party. The focus of my concern
was instead on the then-recent proposal to amend Rule 68, the of-
fer-of-settlement rule. The proposed amendment sought to in-
crease the pressure on the parties to settle, by altering the stan-
dard American rule on attorneys' fees. The amendment would have
made parties liable for the attorneys' fees of their opponent if they
refused an offer of settlement that was better than the judgment
ultimately entered. In criticizing this proposal, I drew an analogy
between the settlement of civil suits and its criminal counterpart,
plea bargaining, and tried to show how settlement is subject to
many of the criticisms commonly voiced against plea bargaining.
I acknowledged that settlement saves society the resources
that would otherwise be consumed at trial, and that settlement has
certain other benefits, primarily because it rests on the parties'
consent. But I also insisted that there was another side to the bal-
ance sheet: Settlements are especially likely to reflect the inequali-
ties of power and resources that the parties bring to the bargaining
table; they may well affect parties who were not and could not
have been part of the negotiation; they may leave the courts with-
out an adequate foundation for subsequent interventions; and, fi-
nally, they provide no authoritative declaration of rights. Settle-
ments often produce peace but leave justice undone. Although
these arguments were primarily addressed to the proposed amend-
ment to Rule 68, and the effort to increase the pressure on the
parties to settle, they obviously had important implications for the
ADR movement in general. This was recognized by the bar and the
2 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982). See generally Sympo-
sium on Litigation Management, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 306 (1986).
' Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange On Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts (1986).
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academy, and in a subsequent article, I generalized my arguments
and took on ADR in its full scope.4
The topic of this symposium is not ADR, but rather consent
decrees, and it is important to understand at the outset that this
topic bears a complicated relationship to ADR. A consent decree
rests on an agreement or contract between the parties and to that
extent can be seen as simply another ADR method. It substitutes
contract for trial and judgment, and thus is a private form of social
ordering. A consent decree is, however, a very special form of set-
tlement because it introduces an element that is judicial rather
than contractual. A consent decree is an exercise of public power.
A consent decree rests on a contract or exchange, true, but it is
still a decree-an order of a court, backed by the threat of con-
tempt. And it is this judicial element that differentiates the con-
sent decree from the alternatives typically advanced by proponents
of ADR-those alternatives are intended to avoid not only trial
and judgment, but also the courts and the apparatus of the state in
general.
This difference between the methods of resolving lawsuits gen-
erally favored by ADR and consent decrees has caused strange
alignments. Some of those who favor ADR are critical of consent
decrees. The most stunning example is Attorney General Meese.5
There are, however, others who approach ADR and consent de-
crees in a more unitary fashion. This seems to be true of Judge
Easterbrook, who embraces both. He starts with a defense of set-
tlement understood as a purely private or contractual institution,
and then extends his argument to consent decrees, minimizing
their judicial element. He notes in passing some differences be-
tween a consent decree and a contract, but leaves no doubt how he
views a consent decree: "It is a contract all the same."'6 I also take
a unitary approach to ADR and consent decrees, but, unlike Judge
Easterbrook, I am critical of both. I believe that a consent decree
involves all the problems and dangers of a settlement understood
as a purely contractual phenomenon. A consent decree rests on a
contract or exchange, and, since a legal instrument can be no bet-
ter than the ground upon which it rests, a consent decree will be
subject to the same infirmities as settlement. I also believe, how-
4 Owen M. Fiss, ADR: Second Class Justice?, Conn. L. Tribune, p. 1 (March 17, 1986).
5 See Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making by Consent Decree: An Analysis of
Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 241, 242, 279-90.
" Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Chi. Le-
gal F. 19, 20.
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ever, that consent decrees are in one important respect worse than
purely contractual settlements. This defect arises from the fact
that they constitute an appropriation of a public power. Parties
who enter a consent decree are trying to use the judicial power for
their own purposes without recognizing the procedural limitations
on the exercise of that power.
I
ADR is a wide and diverse movement. No single theory ex-
plains or justifies all the various strands. Many defend ADR on the
basis of budgetary considerations, on the saving to society of the
resources that would otherwise be consumed by trial. These propo-
nents of ADR acknowledge that a settlement is more likely to fall
short of justice than a fully adjudicated judgment, but nonetheless
prefer settlement as a method of conflict resolution on the theory
that justice, and the process most likely to lead to it, is simply
something that we cannot afford. They accept the methods of
ADR, including settlement, as second best. Perhaps this is a fair
characterization of Chief Justice Burger's position, but such an at-
titude is not in any way confined to those whose political inclina-
tion is conservative. There are many people on the left who defend
ADR on a second-best theory, not so much to conserve social re-
sources (generally of little concern to the left), but rather to insu-
late public interest litigation from Reagan's new judges.
I am not (wholly) oblivious to these pragmatic considerations.
The subject of my concern here, however, is not these second-best
defenses of ADR (which, in any event, strike me as wholly exagger-
ated and not in the least capable of justifying the broad ADR pro-
gram), but rather the defense of ADR that is couched in more ide-
alistic terms. I am concerned with those who see settlement or
some other form of bargained-for resolution of a lawsuit not as a
second-best alternative, but as a more perfect instrument of justice
than trial and judgment. And on this level, the issue that divides
me from the proponents of settlement is not empirical, as it would
be if we agreed on the definition of justice and then undertook a
study of comparative institutional deficiencies, in order to deter-
mine which institution-adjudication or settlement-would be
more likely to achieve our common aspiration. Rather, the differ-
ence is conceptual, a disagreement over what justice means.
Such conceptual disagreements can take many forms. Profes-
sors McThenia and Shaffer gave us one example. Moved by a reli-
gious vision, they based their preference for settlement, mediation,
and other negotiated resolutions of lawsuits on a conversational
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conception of justice. "Justice is," so they claimed, "what we dis-
cover-you and I, Socrates said-when we walk together, listen to-
gether, and even love one another, in our curiosity about what jus-
tice is and where justice comes from."'7 I dealt with that claim
elsewhere.' Here I take up the claim of Judge Easterbrook who,
invoking a quite different God, and drawing on that rich body of
law and economics literature developed in Chicago in the 1970s,
also aspires to "perfect justice" (his term). The only catch is that
he sees justice as efficiency.
Easterbrook does not emphasize the resource saving for soci-
ety that might come from settlement, for he well understands that
"cheap justice" is not the same as "perfect justice," and that "per-
fect justice" might be quite expensive. Rather, his strategy is to
emphasize the advantages that come to the parties in a settlement.
As he puts it, "Settlements are desirable not only because they
'save the time of the courts' (a social benefit) but also because all
parties to the settlements prefer them to the results they antici-
pate obtaining from the court."9
Implicit in this assertion, and for that matter the entire theory
of justice as efficiency, is a series of three questionable proposi-
tions. One assumes, from the very existence of a settlement, a pref-
erence of the parties for the terms of the settlement over what they
anticipate they will receive from a court after trial and judgment.
A second transforms that relative and conditioned preference (set-
tlement over adjudication, given the costs of trial, the politics of
the judges, etc.) into a statement of what "all affected people de-
sire," and then further transforms what "all affected people desire"
into that which is "desirable." And a third transforms that which
is "desirable," as it is now understood, into that which is "just." Of
the three, the last proposition is the most troubling, and perhaps
the most relevant for our purposes, for it tends to belittle the ulti-
mate and most distinctive aspirations of the law and of adjudica-
tion. But all three are central to the argument that seeks to estab-
lish the priority of settlement, and the underlying exchange, as the
instrument of "perfect justice."
To grasp the full sweep of this argument, and the theory that
sees justice as efficiency, we must, for the moment, step back from
the courthouse and turn to the market. We should imagine two
7 Andrew W. McThenia and Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 Yale L.J. 1660,
1665 (1985). 0
8Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 Yale L.J. 1669 (1985).
Easterbrook, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 25 (cited in note 6).
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persons bargaining and assume that each person engaged in the
transaction knows his or her desires or preferences best; that each
is trying to maximize the satisfaction of his or her preferences; and
that each is free to engage in the transaction. Under these condi-
tions, an exchange will take place between the two if, and only if, it
will improve both their positions. If it can now be further assumed
that the transaction will not adversely affect the interests of any-
one else, the transaction appears highly desirable. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine who might complain, since everyone's position will
have been improved. As Easterbrook, following Pareto, declares,
"[w]e should applaud a procedure that makes everyone better off
without making anyone else worse off."1
From this perspective, exchange appears as an almost perfect
institution for maximizing the satisfaction of preferences under
conditions of scarcity. And since it is commonly assumed that the
maximum satisfaction of preferences is the goal of the economic
system, we can readily understand the paramount place of ex-
change in that system. Easterbrook and others who see justice as
efficiency do not want to stop there, however, but envision a simi-
lar role for bargaining and exchange within the legal system. They
attribute to that system the same end we attribute to the economic
system: maximizing the satisfaction of preferences. They assume
that the end of the legal system is to maximize the satisfaction of
preferences, and accordingly, conceive of bargaining, exchange and
contract as the primary social mechanisms for achieving justice.
Adjudication is not, even under this theory, totally superflu-
ous, but more in the nature of a supplementary institution. It ex-
ists in the shadow of bargaining (to reverse the Mnookin and
Kornhauser metaphor). 1 Sometimes adjudication facilitates bar-
gaining and exchange by, for example, demarcating property
rights, enforcing contracts, or preventing fraud. There are times,
however, when a bargained-for exchange is not possible, no matter
what the court does (e.g., the number of people affected is too
large), but even then, exchange retains its primacy, for it is as-
sumed that the function of the court is to mimic the market: The
just result is that to which the parties would agree were they able
to engage in exchange. And if that is so, we can well understand
the priority of settlement or some other bargained-for resolution of
a lawsuit: It embodies what the court could only hope to achieve
10 Id.
" Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979).
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after trial.
Confronted with any particular exchange, whether it involves
the purchase of a consumer good or the settlement of a lawsuit, it
is, of course, possible to object on the ground that the agreement
does not satisfy one of the conditions previously specified for a
"Pareto superior exchange" (that is, one that would, from the per-
spective of satisfying preferences, leave everyone better off). For
example, someone might try to show that consent to the transac-
tion is not freely given, that the parties do not in fact know what is
in their best interest, or that the interests of third parties will be
adversely affected. These kinds of objections are thoroughly can-
vassed in the literature and are well known to Easterbrook. He ar-
gues for settlement on the theory that exchange is the preferred
instrument of justice, but never in a way that overlooks the fact
that, on occasion, the conditions hypothesized for Pareto superior
exchange might not be satisfied. As he makes evident in Part II of
his paper, where he deals with government consent decrees and the
problem of succession in office, he is even prepared to identify cer-
tain categories of consent decrees as suspect or problematic, be-
cause the conditions originally specified for a Pareto superior ex-
change are not likely to be satisfied. 2
This strikes me as an important concession, and one may ob-
ject to Easterbrook's position on the ground that the exception is
far broader than he acknowledges. The danger that a settlement
and the consent decree based on it might bind successors in office,
even though they have not consented to the settlement or the de-
cree, and are not fully or adequately represented in the bargaining
process, is not in any way confined to government agencies. It is
present whenever one of the parties to the agreement is a large
scale organization. Indeed, going further, one could rightly claim,
as Burt Neuborne did in response to Douglas Laycock's paper, 3
that any rule barring settlements or consent decrees from compro-
mising the interests of third parties would put an end to bar-
gained-for resolutions of public litigation. Such cases always impli-
cate the interests of third parties who do not participate in the
bargaining and are not fully represented in that process. My real
objection to Easterbrook's position, however, is of another charac-
ter. It goes not to the scope of exceptions he allows to the rule
favoring bargain and exchange, but rather to the rule itself and the
12 Easterbrook, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 31 (cited in note 6).
" Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting
Third Parties, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 103.
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theory of justice upon which it is founded. My objection goes not
to the estimate of the number of exchanges that fail to meet the
conditions presupposed by a Pareto superior exchange, but rather
to the claim that justice is efficiency, or the series of propositions
that move from what the parties prefer to what is desirable and
then on to what is just. This is not to deny that some (or even
many) exchanges improve the position of everyone in the sense
Pareto envisioned, or to deny that bargaining and exchange are, as
a general matter, apt instruments for maximizing the satisfaction
of preferences; rather, it is to understand justice and the function
of adjudication in different terms altogether.
Leave the marketplace. Return to the courthouse and imagine
a typical school desegregation case (or any other case that is at the
center of the current debate about consent decrees). The social
function of that proceeding is not, I believe, to maximize the satis-
faction of the preferences of the parties, or even of all the residents
of the city, or to help the blacks and the school board bargain with
one another. Nor should a court, even if it could, define its task in
terms of some hypothesized market transaction. The just result is
most emphatically not a guess as to what the parties, or the vari-
ous groups they represent, would agree to were they able to engage
in exchange. The court's duty is, instead, to do justice: to ascertain
whether the commitment to racial equality embodied in the Four-
teenth Amendment has been violated, and if so, to establish a re-
gime of state power that will bring the school board into compli-
ance with the law. Adjudication is a process by which the values
embodied in the law are interpreted and actualized, not a method
for maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and justice is the
ultimate aspiration of that process.
Justice might be efficiency if we somehow managed to trans-
late the values of the law into the preferences of the parties (or the
people they represent) and also assumed that all preferences have
an equal claim to satisfaction (under what Judge Bork calls "the
Equal Gratification Principle" 14), but we have never been given a
good reason-by Easterbrook or any other practitioner of the Chi-
cago brand of law and economics-for such a reduction. Deciding
what the constitutional commitment to racial equality requires, in
terms of both rights and duties, is a difficult and arduous task, but
" Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.
L.J. 1 (1971). The reduction of values into preferences, and the assumption that all prefer-
ences are of equal worth, are necessary to make the end of adjudication purely quantita-
tive-maximization, as understood by the economists.
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no one will be helped in that endeavor by thinking of the parties to
a desegregation suit as though they were participants in a market
exchange, haggling over the price of a bicycle, trying to maximize
the satisfaction of their preferences under conditions of scarcity.
What they are fighting over is the meaning of the law and how it is
to be implemented-and that is what the court must decide. 15
Admittedly, our courts are not self starting. They await con-
troversies to arise and for people or agencies, public or private, to
bring before them claims that the law has been violated. It is also
true that if, for some reason (e.g., disinterest or a deal), the parties
do not wish to proceed further, the court is not likely to continue
the suit by itself or order the parties to go on. An agreement be-
tween the contending parties is an event that stops the exercise of
the judicial power. This dependence of the judiciary upon the initi-
ative of others is not hard to understand-it can be traced to the
historical fact that courts lack the resources required for initiation,
or perhaps to the fear that for a court to become an initiating
agency might compromise its impartiality.16 One can acknowledge
the judiciary's dependence on others without suggesting that this
dependency transforms the social function of adjudication from in-
terpreting and actualizing public values into one of maximizing the
satisfaction of the preferences of the parties. The capacity of an
institution to discharge its social function may be limited by cer-
tain conditions without that function or aspiration becoming re-
duced to those conditions.
Of course, the parties might come to an agreement that gives
full and adequate expression to the values embodied in the law.
The plaintiff might demand too much, and come to his or her
senses in the midst of the case, or the defendant might agree to
comply after the lawsuit is filed. Anything is possible. But once we
eschew the theory that sees justice as efficiency, we have no a pri-
ori or theoretical reason for believing that the parties are more
likely than a court to do justice, that through bargaining they are
more likely than a court, after trial and judgment, to hit on the
right interpretation of equal protection. Predictions about the law
enter into the bargain, but what the parties seek to further in their
negotiations is their own interests, not the law, and thus these pre-
dictions about the law appear in the final agreement in a compli-
cated and attenuated form.
" See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1986).
"6 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev..353, 385-87
(1978).
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This might seem to leave adjudication and bargaining at a
standstill, each making a claim to justice, understood now as the
ultimate aspiration of law, with no a priori or theoretical reason for
preferring one over the other. There are agreements or bargains
that fall short of justice, but the same could be said of adjudica-
tion. My inclination is, however, not to stop here, but rather to
reverse Easterbrook's priorities and to claim a priority for judg-
ment over contract. I acknowledge that adjudication consumes so-
cial resources and that settlement might save those resources and
provide some private advantage to the parties-why else would
they agree? But I believe that adjudication and judgment are, as a
general matter, more likely to produce justice than bargaining, and
that is why we tend to measure the adequacy of a settlement-not
as a device to produce peace, but as an instrument of justice-by
comparing it to the judgment that might have been entered after a
full trial (not, as Easterbrook supposes, the other way around).
To some extent this position reflects doubts voiced earlier
about the prevalence of the conditions that are presupposed by
Pareto, Easterbrook, and others who are inclined to favor bargain-
ing or private ordering in general. Bargaining presupposes an indi-
vidualistic party structure that is at odds with the realities of
much contemporary litigation, especially the cases that are at the
center of controversies over consent decrees. The paradigmatic
party in such litigation is not the autonomous individual, but the
social group or bureaucratic entity, with no clearly demarcated au-
thoritative spokespersons. Third-party interests are always com-
promised. Those who celebrate bargaining and exchange also pre-
suppose a rough parity among the participants to the transaction
that I find at odds with modern realities as well. Settlement is said
to favor the "poorer" party, for the costs of litigation are saved,
but those savings are likely to be reflected in the terms of the set-
tlement-what the "richer" party will offer in order to bring the
litigation to an end.
These doubts about the efficacy of exchange obviously reflect
sociological hunches about settlement and consent decree practice.
There is, however, another, less empirical factor that leads me to
favor adjudication over bargaining, as the institution most likely to
produce justice. It stems from the very nature of the two institu-
tions and the fact that one is private, the other public: Whereas
bargaining is directed toward maximizing the satisfaction of the
preferences of the parties, the goal of adjudication is, after all,
justice.
At least in the category of cases we are considering, all from
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the equity side of the court, adjudication can be understood as a
social institution that allocates the power of decision to public offi-
cials (judges), and that conditions the exercise of that power on an
investigation that occurs in public (the trial) and on a statement of
reasons (the opinion) that is accessible to the public and that seeks
to persuade the public of the correctness of the judgment. None of
this can assure that the result in any particular case will be the
just result, but it defines the aspiration of the institution in appro-
priate terms and establishes mechanisms of accountability-public
criticism, legislative revision, and in some cases, removal from of-
fice. The judiciary is held accountable for the justice of its results
in a way that is not true of the parties in bargaining. It is not only
that bargaining typically goes on behind closed doors, and thus is
inaccessible to public scrutiny, but also that the bargaining is dom-
inated by, and is conducted for the purpose of furthering, the in-
terests of the parties who are in control of that process.
Sometimes those interests might be broadly conceived, as for
example, when a party is represented by a "public interest" law
firm, or when the party is a governmental entity. Yet even in such
cases, the conception of interests is not coextensive with the inter-
est in justice that guides the judiciary and to which the judiciary is
held accountable; the ACLU or the Department of Justice is enti-
tled to allow resource constraints or politics understood quite
broadly to determine what they will accept (or refuse to accept) in
negotiating a settlement. In the great majority of cases, moreover,
involving private parties and corporations, the ruthless pursuit of
self interest, narrowly conceived, is the accepted norm in bargain-
ing relationships and constitutes the standard by which the ex-
change is measured: A settlement works when the parties are
happy or their desires are satisfied.
I acknowledge that such private bargaining might on occasion,
through the wonders of the invisible hand or some other mysteri-
ous mechanism, lead to the just outcome-justice and happiness
are not mutually exclusive. But assuming that we have truly es-
chewed the view that treats justice as efficiency, and that confuses
justice with happiness or even peace, it seems to me that justice is
less likely to be achieved through bargaining than through the nor-
mal working of a public institution-adjudication-which self-con-
sciously and purposively aspires to that end, knowing full well that
it will be held accountable if it fails. To favor adjudication over
bargaining is to express *a faith in collective reason, that is, in our
capacity, as a people, to formulate social goals and to build institu-
tions that self consciously try to achieve those goals.
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II
A consent decree is premised upon a bargain between the par-
ties, but is not, as I already said, reducible to that bargain. A con-
sent decree differs from the bargain in as much as it represents an
exercise of public power. It is an order by a court, directing certain
parties to do or refrain from doing certain things, backed by an
implicit threat of state sanctions for noncompliance.
Of course, if the bargain upon which the consent decree rests
is defective in some important respects then the consent decree
will also be defective. Water can rise no higher than its source. If
the exchange does not improve the position of all (because, for ex-
ample, it makes third parties worse off and does so to a degree
greater than it improves the position of those who signed the pact),
then the decree will suffer this same defect. In the eyes of Pareto,
such a consent decree will be as inadequate as the exchange upon
which it rests. The same is true from the standpoint of Justitia: If
the bargaining results in a deal that falls short of justice, under-
stood in a more expansive sense than Pareto might allow, so will
the consent decree. It seems to me, however, that there is another
and perhaps more fundamental point that should be made: There
is reason to object to a consent decree even if we can assume, solely
for purposes of argument, that it rests upon an exchange that im-
proves the position of everyone, or is in some more robust sense
substantially just, for a consent decree, almost by definition, con-
stitutes a use of the judicial power that does not respect the proce-
dural limitations on the exercise of that power.
Professor Resnik asked in the course of our discussion, "What
does a judge do before entering a consent decree?" and answered,
quite succinctly, "Nothing." This might have been a bit of an exag-
geration, but not much. As she points out,17 many consent decrees
are entered, that is, signed by the judge and filed with the clerk of
the court, at the very same moment that the complaint is filed.
The lawsuit is ended as soon as it is begun. Other consent decrees
are entered as the litigation unfolds, but even these are entered
before that process has come to conclusion, that is, before the trial
is over, or before the court finds the facts or applies the law. There
is still a final category of consent decrees that are entered after the
judge has concluded that the defendant has violated the law, but
before the court fixes the remedy. In that instance, the process
that is pretermitted is the one in which the remedy is fashioned. A
" Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 43, 47.
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consent decree is, by definition, based on an agreement between
the parties, not on the judgment of a court, and thus the stage of
the litigation at which the decree is entered makes no difference.
Consent decrees are not preceded by the full and meticulous exam-
ination of the facts and the law that normally precedes and consti-
tutes judgment. That is, indeed, the whole point of a consent
decree.
A judge, of course, has a choice at the outset whether to sign
the decree proposed by the parties, and in fact is supposed to ask
whether the proposed decree "furthers the objectives of the law" or
is "fair, adequate and reasonable."18 This standard, similar to the
"probable cause" standard used in the criminal law to test the ade-
quacy of a plea, is a lesser standard than would be applied by the
judge after full trial. Of even greater significance is the fact that
the court is asked to apply that standard in something of a proce-
dural vacuum. No doubt, the judge will be confronted with various
representations and assurances by the parties as to facts and to the
state of the law. But those representations-made soon after both
sides have struck a deal and at a time when they are anxious to
make sure it does not come undone-are no substitute for the me-
ticulous processes of the law, trial in an adversarial context and a
judgment based on the record and justified publicly. This is partic-
ularly true because the judge will often have his or her own per-
sonal reasons to avoid the tensions of a long trial or the agony of
judgment, and thus be tempted to accept these representations at
face value.
A consent decree is not written in stone. If a court later learns,
after a full hearing, that the initial consent decree is not in accor-
dance with the law, or is otherwise unjust, the court might modify
the decree or decline to enforce it (in general or against particular
persons). This so-called "second hearing" does not, however, ade-
quately compensate for the absence of a "first hearing," that is,
one that might be conducted prior to entry of the decree. For one
thing, since judicial credibility is not enhanced when a court de-
clines to enforce its decrees or declares that the initial decree is not
fair or not effective, and thus needs modification, a subtle bias will
inevitably enter the so-called "second hearing" in favor of the ini-
tial decree. In the case of modification, the bias is not especially
subtle: A court faced with a request by the defendant for modifica-
tion is supposed to decide, in the terms of Cardozo, whether the
18 See generally Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
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danger that the decree seeks to curb has been "attenuated to a
shadow."19 Second, the "second hearing" is likely to be encum-
bered and complicated by the absence of a hearing in the first in-
stance. Because of the absence of the initial findings of fact or con-
clusions of law, there will be no clear basis for identifying what the
aims or purposes of the original decree are, either for determining
whether a violation has occurred or deciding whether conditions
have sufficiently changed to warrant modification. The judge faced
with a request for modification must reconstruct, in the "second
hearing," the factual situation that preceded the entry of the con-
sent decree in order to determine whether the danger to be curbed
by the decree has in fact disappeared or whether the decree has
become, due to a change of circumstances, oppressive. Finally, as
Judge Easterbrook recognizes in his treatment of government con-
sent decrees, as long as the consent decree is on the books, it looks
like "the law" and purports to be "the law," and as such, is likely
to influence behavior, by discouraging some from acting or by em-
powering others.
Foregoing the processes of the law may save society resources.
Something is saved, but something is also lost. The procedural
shortcut enhances the risk of error. Adjudication may be elaborate
and expensive, but I do not view it as either dysfunctional or ar-
cane. It reflects our best judgment, worked out over centuries, as to
how to sort out the truth in the face of uncertainty. Changes may
be necessary, in the way witnesses are examined, or as to the scope
of discovery, or in some other particular, but I am not convinced
that we can dispense with that process altogether-as consent de-
crees do-without greatly increasing the risk of error.
There is, however, a deeper point, and indeed must be, for my
claim is that a consent decree is a highly problematic legal instru-
ment even if one assumes, for purposes of argument, that the
agreement between the parties fully and adequately represents
what the law requires and is in that sense substantially just. To
maintain this position, one need only recognize that processes of
the law serve not only an instrumental function, but a legitimating
one as well: The processes foregone are not simply valued because
they reduce the risk of error, but also because they serve as an
important source of legitimacy for the judicial power. The author-
ity of judges to speak the law, to determine, for example, what the
constitutional commitment to racial equality requires, arises not
' United States v. Swift & Co., 186 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
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from any supposed moral expertise the judges might possess as
persons, but from the processes that limit the exercise of their
power and thus define their office. Yet it is with these very
processes that the consent decree practice dispenses.20
I understand why the parties to a lawsuit might want to skip
these processes and settle rather than litigate: Each believes that
he or she will be better off settling. I also understand why the
plaintiff might wish to embody that agreement in a consent decree:
The decree commits the court, from the very outset, to enforcing
the agreement through the exercise of the contempt power. A set-
tlement agreement, like any contract, might be subject to specific
performance at some later time, if one of the parties breaches or
threatens a breach; but transforming the settlement agreement
into a consent decree at the outset gives the plaintiff the benefit of
the contempt power right away and avoids the bother and vicissi-
tudes of the trial that otherwise must precede the issuance of an
order granting specific performance. Each infraction of the agree-
ment is not just a breach, but also a contempt. I also understand
why the defendant might acquiesce in the plaintiff's effort to get
the settlement agreement embodied in a consent decree: Such ac-
quiescence might be a condition of the settlement (which in other
respects is favorable to the defendant) or the defendant might per-
ceive some strategic or political advantage in being subject to a
consent decree (e.g., it is harder for a subsequent administration to
repudiate). In other words, I fully understand why the parties
might ask the court to transform their settlement agreement into a
decree, but the choice is not theirs to make. Trial and judgment
exist not just for the benefit of the parties, but are intended to
serve public purposes, and thus cannot be waived or otherwise dis-
posed of by the parties, and, if they have a basis in Article III or
precepts of natural law (as to what it means to act as a court), may
even be beyond the reach of the legislature.21 The judge must
2 See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1979). For
these reasons, I take exception to the view of Justice Brennan, expressed in Local Number
93, 106 S. Ct. at 3077-78. He is prepared to allow, at least in the Title VII context, consent
decrees more latitude than adjudicated decrees in terms of what the court might require of
the defendant. In my view, dispensing with the ordinary processes of the law, namely, trial
and judgment, should restrict rather than enhance the power of the court.
21 Clever Brandeis, anxious to facilitate the use of consent decrees, especially in the
antitrust context, insulated them from the obvious Article III objection by holding that such
an objection cannot be raised by a motion to vacate, but only on direct review (which, of
course, is most unlikely in the consent decree context). Swift & Company v. United States,
276 U.S. 311, 313 (1928). For an expression of the view that accords to courts, not on the
basis of Article III but rather on the basis of some conception of "the traditions of equity
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stand as the guardian of the powers with which he or she is en-
trusted. The judge acts not just for himself or herself, but as a
trustee for the judiciary, and should see the parties' request for
what it is-an attempt to appropriate public power for private
purposes. The judge should simply decline the parties' request.
This might result in a trial, on the assumption that the decretal
aspect of the bargain was an indispensable part of the settlement,
but if not, the parties can still end the litigation through an agree-
ment. That agreement might on some later occasion, after it is
duly examined and tested under the terms of the contract law of
the jurisdiction, be enforceable in court; but until that occurs it
would not bear the imprimatur of the court. That agreement be-
tween the parties might in the meantime be viewed as "a good
deal," but until it is duly tested and examined through a legal pro-
ceeding it could not claim to be "the law." In saying this my intent
is not, contrary to what Easterbrook suggests, to deny judges a role
in private ordering,22 but only to see to it that their participation
in such arrangements scrupulously respects the principles that de-
fine and limit their office. The issue is not whether, but how.
III
Skillfully trying to draw the reader in, Judge Easterbrook be-
gins his essay with a claim that "[a]ny legal system that finds com-
pliance with law attractive should find settlement of disputes at-
tractive.' ' 23 I, of course, find compliance with the law attractive,
but remain skeptical of settlement, because, having eschewed the
justice as efficiency claim, I do not believe that there is any reason
for presuming that a settlement embodies the law. Settlement is
not the same as compliance. The parties' predictions about what
the court will do and thus what the law requires no doubt enter
the bargaining process, but so does a lot more, and that is why it is
wrong to equate settlement, understood in a purely contractual
sense, and compliance.
Judge Easterbrook's essay is not, however, just a defense of
settlement agreements, but also and perhaps more pointedly, a de-
fense of the practice of embodying those agreements in decrees. He
therefore moves quickly, in the opening passage of his essay, from
the equation of settlement and compliance to an equation of con-
practice," the power to resist legislative directives, see Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,
329 (1944).
22 Easterbrook, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 30 (cited in note 6).
23 Id. at 20.
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tracts and consent decrees. He notes a few minor differences be-
tween contracts and consent decrees, but argues that a consent de-
cree "is a contract all the same," differing from the ordinary
contract only in the "speed of enforcement. 2 4 "So," he concludes,
in an attempt to establish another irresistible axiom, "any legal
system that finds both voluntary compliance and voluntary con-
tracts attractive should find consent decrees attractive. 25 I, of
course, remain unmoved. I find "voluntary compliance" very at-
tractive. I find "voluntary contracts" less attractive than "volun-
tary compliance," but still somewhat attractive. But I do not find
consent decrees attractive at all. I am able to resist Easterbrook's
conclusion because, contrary to what he suggests, a "consent de-
cree" is something more than a "voluntary contract." It represents
an exercise of public power that has not been preceded by the
processes that serve as the source of the legitimacy and authority
of that power. Judge Easterbrook would have us believe that skip-
ping trial and judgment is nothing more than a "speeding up" of
the process by which a contract is backed by the contempt power.
But surely that is wrong. It is one thing to take a journey quickly
and another not to take a journey at all.
24 Id.
25 Id.

